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Summary findings
Like many large countries, Indonesia has difficulty  civil service appointment.) But providing specialist
attracting doctors to service in rural and remote areas.  training as an incentive to work in remote areas is not
To guide the creation of incentives for service in these  only expensive, but potentially inefficient, since specialist
areas, Chomitz and colleagues analyze two sets of data  practice and rural public health management require
about physicians: (1) the locations chosen by graduating  different skills and attitudes.
medical students before and after a major change in the  - Moderately (but not extremely) remote areas can be
incentive system, and (2) survey data on choices among  staffed using modest cash incentives.
hypothetical assignments differing in compensation,  * Doctors from the Outer Islands are far more willing
career prospects, and amenities at various locations.  to serve in remote areas than their counterparts  from
Their findings suggest that:  Java. So, it may be worthwhile increasing the
The current  policy of offering specialist training is  representation of Outer Island students in medical
incentive enough to make doctors from Java willing to  schools (perhaps through scholarships and assistance in
serve in remote areas. (It is not necessary to also offer a  pre-university preparation).
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Understanidably,  most physicianis  prefer to settle In urban areas offering opportunities for
professional developimient,  educationl  and other amenities for their families, and attractive
employmilenit  opportun-ities. But it is in rural and remote areas, especially in the developing
countries, thiat  the most severe public healthi  problems are found.  As a result, there is a mismatch
between the geographic distributioll of physicianis  and the perceived need for them. (Anderson
and Rosenberg 1990; World Banki  1994, p 142).
The geographic distribution of physicians is of particular concerni  for Indoniesia.  Indonesia's
vast size and difficult geography present a tremendous challenige  to hiealth  services delivery.  It is
difficult to place doctors in remote island, mountain, or forest locations with few amenities, no
opportunlities  for private practice, and poor communicationis  with the rest of the country. The
problem of placing staff in rural areas is further complicated by the rapid growth of lucrative
private sector employment prospects in the largest urban areas.  In addition, Indolnesia's
development goals strongly emphasize equity across regions, with particular stress on improving
healthi  status in the most remote and poorly served areas.  The country's success in placing health
centers in all of its subdistricts only increases the challenige  of ensurinig  that those centers are
staffed.
To improve the geographical distribution of physicians, governments often hiave  used
combinationis  of compulsory service and incenitives.  Incenitives  for rural service have been used
in the US (Connor et al. 1995), Canada (Bolduc et al forthcomilig; Anderson and Rosernberg
1  990), and Norway (Kristiansen 1992). The evaluationi,  and optimal design, of incentive systems
requires an understanding of the responsiveness of physicians to these incentives.  Little,
hiowever,  is systematically kinowil  about physiciani  preferences.  For the developed world, there
are a handful of studies which apply econometric methods to choice data, most notably Bolduc et
al. (forthcominig)  for Quebec, and Hurley (1989, 1990) for the United States; see also Kristiansen
(1992) for Norway. .For the developing world there are only anecdotal reports.
This paper analyzes two complementary sets of data about physician preferences in Indonesia.
First, it examines the actual locational choices made by graduating medical students before and
2after a major change in the incentive system (the revealed preference analysis).  Second, it uses
survey data on choices among hypothetical assignments to determine physicians' preferences
over a set of characteristics describing compensation, career prospects, and locational amenities
(the statedpreference  analysis.)  It builds on, and provides a quaLntitative  follow-up, to an earlier,
focus-group-based study of contract doctor issues in Indonesia (Soemantri et al 1996).
2. PHYSICIAN  DISTRIBUTION  AND HEALTH  POLICY  IN INDONESIA
In lndoniesia,  most doctors are trained in, and wish to remain in, the cosmopolitan areas of Java.
These areas offer good hospital facilities and lucrative opportuniities  for private practice.  In order
to post doctors to the farflung rural health centers of the Indonesian archipelago, the government
has long utilized a system of compulsory service for medical school graduates. In the past, those
assigned to more remote regions were compensated with shorter periods of service, which ranged
from one year at the most remote postings to five years at desirable locations in Java. Following
coompletion  of compulsory service, doctors were assured positions in the civil service hierarchy,
includinig  opportunities for specialist training.
In 1992, this system was modified. Because of a freeze on new civil service hiring, doctors were
hired under contract rather than as civil service employees.  Service was (and remains) however a
prerequisite for obtaining a license to practice.  All service is for a period of three years.  Pay is
tied to remoteness, however.  Currently, doctors serving in 'ordinary'  regions are paid Rp
500,000/mo; those in remote regions, Rp 825,000, and those in very remote regions, Rp
1  ,050,000/mo.  Because doctors in ordinary regions have much greater opportunities for
supplementary earnings from private practice, total income differentials are much smaller. A
doctor working in a 24-hour clinic in Jakarta could probably earn about Rp 1,000,000/monti
(thoughi this would be illegal if the doctor had not yet completed compulsory service.)
Considerinig  the difference in amenities associated with remote postings, the salary incentives are
relatively modest.
Recognizing this, in 1996, the system was further modified.  It vvas  announced that the doctors
serving in very remote regions would be given a 90% chance of subsequent civil service
appointment; those serving in remote regions would have a 50% chance, but the probability drops
to 10% for those serving in ordinary areas.  Because civil servants are eligible for subsidized
3specialist training, and because specialists enjoy both high prestige and income, this was expected
to serve as a powerful inducement.  Section 5 of this paper analyzes the impact of this change in
incentive structure.
A number of important policy questions surround the medium and long-term viability of this
policy.  From the public viewpoint, the policy of offering civil service appointments and
specialist traininlg  as an incenitive  is effective - as we shall see below -- but expensive.  It costs
approximately Rp 60 million to provide specialist training, not includinig  the value of the student's
time.  Since the skills appropriate to running a remote health center differ from those appropriate
to a clinical specialist, the incentive policy may result in mismatches of personnel to these two
quite different positions. Deferring specialist training for the three years of compulsory service
reduces tbe return on that training. Finally, usilng  civil service positions as an incentive is
problematic given the government's policy of zero net growth in the civil service.
For these reasons, there is interest in alternative means for attracting doctors to remote locations.
One possibility is to assemble alternative incentive packages.  Suggested alternatives include
higher cash salaries (Soemantri and others 1996), and reduced periods of compulsory service.
Another possibility is to intensify recruiting of medical students from rural and remote areas, via
scholarships, training programs, or placement of new medical schools.
Many doctors are dissatisified with the system. The compulsory nature of the system imposes a
particular burden on some graduates,  many of them married women, who live in urban Java and
are unable for personal reasons to move to other locations. Since there are few openings for
compulsory service in these areas, these graduates are indefinitely barred from legally practicing
medicine.  More generally, graduates of private medical schools question the rationale for
compulsory service.  So an important question is how much it would cost to attract doctors to
health centers if compulsory service were dropped.  In many ways the issue parallels the US
debate on the all-volunteer army, which also involved considerations of equity, social solidarity,
and economic efficiency.
Finally, the labor market for doctors is changing rapidly.  While there are current concerns about
unemployment of young physicians, the rapid growth of incomes in Indonesia, combined with the
expansion of health insurance schemes in the formal sector, suggests that there will be very rapid
4increases in urban demand for physicians.  This in turn raises the question of  the cost of
maintaining physician services in "ordinary" rural regions -- those which are not remote, but
which lack urban amenities.  Regardless of whether services are financed by public or private
sources, it is of interest to forecast the levels of compensating differentials in salaries that might
be necessary to retain physicians in these areas.
3. MODELING  PHYSICIAN  PREFERENCES
Revealed and stated preference data
Economists' natural tendency is to prefer data on actual choices (revealed preferences) to data on
stated preferences.  Hurley (1989), Bolduc and others (forthcoming), and section 4 below use
this approach.  While this approach has the considerable advantage of an incontravertible
grounding in reality, it has several disadvantages. Most importantly, the range of variation of the
alternatives may be narrow.  This can make it impossible to predict doctors' reactions to new
policy initiatives which, for instance, offer new types or magnitudes of incentives.  Second, it
may be difficult to obtain data on the attributes of the choices, as seen by the doctors.  Third,
there may be considerable multicollinearity among the location-specific attributes of interest,
making it difficult to disentangle their impact on utility.  Finally, the need to consider a very large
number of alternatives requires complex and possibly nonrobust estimation methods.
The use of stated-preference data can overcome these problems (Louviere 1994). Stated-
preference data has increasingly been used in market research to assess consumer reaction to
proposed products, and in environmental economics for valuation of nonmarket goods. In one
variant, choice-based conjoint analysis, respondents are asked to choose between hypothetical
alternatives, where each alternative is described as a bundle of attributes.  Because the researcher
has complete freedom to specify the levels of the attributes, these can encompass ranges of policy
interest, and can be constructed so as to be free of multicollinearity.
Applications of stated-preference discrete-choice models are quite varied. There is a growing
literature on dichotomous-choice contingent valuation models (see, e.g. Alberini and others,
1997). These models typically estimate the demand for a hypothetical environmental good or bad.
Typically the choices vary only in the presence or absence of the good, and the level of a
compensating payment or charge.  More akin to the work presented in this paper are studies
5which look at preferences over bundles of attributes.  For instance, Bunch and others (1993) are
interested in the potential demand for electric vehicles, and assess consumers' preferences over
alternative combinations of purchase price, fuel cost, and range between refueling, in
hypothetical electric and gasoline-powered autos. Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams (1994)
analyze demand for water-based recreational site characteristics such as water quality, type and
quantity of fish present, and entry fee.
The chief risk of the stated preference approach is that stated responses may not accurately reflect
behavior.  For instance, Cummings and others (1995) asked respondents if they would be willing
to purchase specified small items (chocolate, a calculator) at certain prices; the researchers then
actually offered the items for sale at those prices.  They found that stated willingness to purchase
was greater thani  actual willingness.  However, they note that this may be an unfair test; stated
preference respondents may be expressing willingness to purchase at some time in the future,
while the actual purchase decision was to be made on the spot.  In contrast, Louviere (1994) cites
a number of studies showing a good correspondence between predictions derived from stated
preference models and actual market behavior. Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams (1994)
retrieved very similar preference functions from a group of respondents using both revealed
preference and stated preference analyses.  This suggests that respondents can competently
manage hypothetical questions, and that responses are at least qualitatively reliable.  A more
serious problem, especially in the current context, is the potential for strategic misrepresentation,
if respondents believe that incorrect information can yield personal gain. In this paper, we utilize
both types of surveys, checking for consistency.
Utility functions for the nontechnical reader
Note: the technical  reader  may  prefer  to skip this  section.
In order to analyze physician preferences, we use an economic approach called utility theory.
This approach supposes that doctors choose between alternative assignments as  if they have a
system for assigning preference scores ('utilities')  to each alternative, after which they choose the
alternative with the highest score.  For instance, suppose that doctors are choosing among
alternatives which differ in salary, contract length and remoteness.  One doctor might evaluate
the positions with a rule like this: add 2 points for every Rp. 1  00,000/month in salary; subtract I I
points for every year of contract length; subtract 20 points if the location is remote, and 30 points
6if it is very remote.  Another doctor, with a greater relative desire for cash and tolerance for
disamenities, might assign 4 points for every Rp. I OO,OOO/mont:h,  but only subtract 5 points for
remote location.
The methodology used here employs statistical methods to deduice  particular scoring systems for
particular types of doctors, so that these scoring systems describe doctors' observed choices as
well as possible.  In the revealedpreference  analysis, we look at how doctors' characteristics
affect their choices among four broad locational classes of assignments.  In the stated preference
analysis, we ask doctors to choose among hypothetical assignments described in more detail,
focusing on how the characteristics of the assignments affect the doctors' choices among them.
Utility function specification
Note: nontechnical readers may refer to the previous subsection and skip this one.
Utility-theoretic models of physician choice of location have been estimated by Hurley (1989)
for the US, Bolduc and others (forthcoming) for Canada.  These models are special cases of
standard random utility model (see Louviere 1994, Berry 1994):
tJ;  = f(xi,  zj) + uij
where
Uij  is the utility of doctor i for assignmentj,
xi are characteristics of doctor i
zj  are characteristics of assignmentj
and uij  is a random disturbance term.
Doctors are assumed to choose the alternative with the highest utility.  The nature of the data, and
assumptions about the nature of the disturbance term determine the method of estimation.  Strong
assumptions about the error terms yield an easy-to-estimate multinomial logit model. The key
assumption is the independence of irrelevant alternatives, which is equivalent to assuming that
the uij are independent between  j; that is, that unobserved factors affecting a doctor's liking for
7alternative I are uncorrelated with unobserved factors affecting her taste for alternative 2. Wlhere
a larger number of closely-related alternatives are considered, this assumption is not tenable.
Hurley therefore uses a nested logit model, and Bolduc and others use a sophisticated,
computationally demanding multinomial probit model.  In the revealed preference analysis
below, we address this problem by aggregating the alternatives into arguably distinctive
categories.
The specification of f depends on the nature of the available data.  If there is information about
the doctors, but little or no information about attributes of the choices, it is natural to choose the
form:
f(xi,  zj)= xif3  + uii
with separate parameter vectors for each of a limited number ofalternativesj.  If the disturbances
uij are assumed to have independent identical Weibull distributions, then this yields a
multinomial logit model, witlh:
probability (i chooses j) = exp(xir3j  )/V1k  xi0k]
(where Po  are normalized to 0 for some comparison group)
This approach was used in the revealed preference analysis. The locational choices were grouped
into four categories: j= Java/Bali, the comparison group; outer islands nonremote; outer islanids
remote; outer islands very remote.  Separate parameter vectors were estimated, via multinomial
logit, for each of the categories except the first.
Where there is extensive information about characteristics of the choices, it is more convenient to
estimate:
(])  Uij=Xij+uij
where the vector X describes attributes of the choice, the doctor, and their interactioni,  and there
is now a single parameter vector P. (In practice, separate equations can be estimated for distinct
groups, e.g., males and females).
This was the approach used in the stated preference analysis. In each choice task, the respondent
is presented with two alternatives.  Alternative I is chosen if:
8This condition holds if:
(Xi - Xi2) P+ (uijI- Ui2)> 0
If we assume that the disturbance terms u are independently and identically distributed, and
define
(2)  y*= (XiI- Xi2)  3+  (uijI- ui2)
y=1 if choice is assignment 1
then we have a simple probit model.
Note that there is no constant term, because utilities are defined only up to an additive constant.
In addition, the differencing prodedure makes it necessary to exclude one member of each set of
mutually exclusive dummy variables to avoid the dummy variable trap.
The assumption of independent, homoscedastic error terms facilitates analysis, and has been
standard in the literature.  It can be thought of as representing a random error as the respondent
tries to come up with a utility estimate.  It is however a strong assumption, and its failure would
mean that estimates are inconsistent. Further, it does not well represent taste heterogeneity, and
can be thought of
A direction for future work is to allow for taste heterogeneity by through a random coefficients
specification (Berry 1993). The earlier framework would be modified to become:
Uij = Xij
where P3=P*  + ei
ei -N(O,Q), with ei uncorrelated between individuals
Now the vector P* describe mean tastes: the mean coefficient for each attribute. Actual tastes
vary between individuals. For instance, individuals with a high marginal utility for income would
have a high eincome; those with a high marginal disutility for remote areas would have a negative
9eremoteness. Tlhe  genieral form for the variance-covariance inatrix of e reflects the possibility that
tastes for particular attributes are intercorrelated across the population; for instance, the marginal
utility of income and remoteness may be negatively correlated. This model can be rewritten in the
form of (2) as:
y*= (Xi I- Xi2)  3*+  (XiI  ei  -Xi2ei)
where nlow  the variance of the error term is a functioni  of X I 1,Xi2, and Q.  This can in principle
be estimated by an appropriately-adjusted probit.  (Chesher 1995 suggests an alternate but similar
approach, heterogeneity-adjusted logit.)  However, this becomes computational ly chal lenging
where, as in the present case, n would have a large number of parameters to be estimated.  Note
also that if a respondent replies to multiple choice tasks, the errors will be correlated across those
tasks, further complicating estimation. These econometric refinements are left for future work.
4. REVEALED PREFERENCE  ANALYSIS1
Background  and data
Each year, the Ministry of Health assigns two or three batches of graduating medical students to
the compulsory contract positions.  To facilitate the process, each candidate is asked to specify
first, second, and third choices of posting. Each choice consists of both a province and a
remoteness category: ordinary or nonremote (biasa), remote (terpencil) and very remote (sangat
terpencil).  Not all combinations are possible; there are virtually no 'very remote' postinigs  in
Java, and no 'ordinary' postings in some outlying provinces. To reduce the large number of
alternatives to a more manageable set -- and one to which the independence of irrelevant
alternatives assumption might plausibly apply -- we aggregated the available choices into four
broad alternatives, based on the combination of province and remoteness:
Java & Bali  Outer  Islands
Nonremote  Alternative  0  Alternative  I
Remote  (comparison  Alternative  2
Very  remote  group)  Alternative  3
Note: there  are few remote  postings  and almost  no very  remote  postings  in Java-Bali.
Primary  contributors  to this section  are Kenneth  Chomitz  and Gunawan  Setiadi.
10Alternative 0, Java-Bali, coi1sists  overwhelmingly of nonremote lpostings. This was used as the
comparison group which multinomial logit requires. That is, sets of coefficients were estimated
for each of the other three groups.  The equation for one of these groups give the predicted
logarithm of the odds of choosing that group relative to the compiarison  group.
We obtained the choice data for the  12th and 13th assignment batches.  The latter was the first
under the new policy linking service in remote areas to subsequent civil service appointment.
Basic demographic and background data were also obtained for each candidate, including age,
gender, marital status, number of children, religion, and medical faculty.  Because graduates who
do not accept an assignment are held over and permitted to bid in subsequent batches, we
restricted our attention to those who had registered after the cutolf for the previous batch in order
to focus on the choices of new entrants to the process.
Appendix table 1 shows definitions and mean values of independent variables for the two
batches.
Results  and discussion
Simple cross tabulations (see Table 1) show the powerful impact of the change in incentives.  In
batch 12, among students graduating from medical faculties in Java/Bali, only 5.6% of males and
1.7% of females volunteered to go to very remote areas in the Outer Islands.  In batch 13, those
proportions increased to 20.7% and 6.7%.  The cross tabulations also show that, regardless of the
incentive regime, students from outer island faculties are far more likely to volunteer for remote
and very remote outer island assignments than are students from Java/Bali faculties.
Multivariate analysis allows us to determine whether these observed relations are due to omitted
factors such as age or private schooling.  This is potentially important since the mix of doctors
(e.g., proportion from private school) varies substantially between batches. The multinomial logit
results are shown in appendix table 2 . For both batches 12 and 13, the results are extremely
statistically significant.  Tables of predicted versus actual choices;  are shown below.
Predicted versus actual choices: Batch 12
11Actual  I  predicted  choice
choice  I  Outer  Island
I  Java/Bali  nonremote  remote  very  reml  Total
…__________+…___________________________________________+__________
Java  Bali  360  7  12  1  1  380
OI:nonremote  37  23  20  1  1  81
OI:  remote  24  11  35  2  1  72
OI:  very  remote  16  1  20  2  39
…__________+________---___________________________+  …_________
Total  I  437  42  87  6  1  572
Predicted versus actual choices: Batch 13
Actual  I  predicted
choice  Outer  Island
I  Java/Bali  nonremote  remote  very  remote  Total
…__  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ +  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  +…__  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Java/Bali  I  89  31  13  1  1  134
OI:  nonremote  43  109  47  23  1  222
OI:  remote  19  82  76  21  1  198
OI:  very  remote  21  23  39  41  1  124
…__  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _+…__  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  +…__  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Total  I  172  245  175  86  1  678
Main results
The results are most easily understood by examining the predicted effect of a change in a
particular variable on the choice probabilities.  Figure I shows the predicted choice probabilities
of four classes of students: male/female x Java-Bali medical school /Outer Island medical school,
for the two batches2. These predictions closely mirror the cross-tabulation results presented
above.  There are several important results:
1) Incentives had a large impact on the willingness of Java/Bali graduates to volunteer for
remote and very remote posts.
Compare the columns marked "Java male 12", "Java male 13". Controlling for other
characteristics, the proportion willing to go to ordinary or remote posts in the outer islands
2 Other variables  set as follows:  graduation  year  = 1995,  birthyear=  1967,  unmarried,  public  school
graduate.
12increases almost threefold, from about 17% to fbouf 50%.  The proportion willing to go to very
remote posts increases more than fivefold, from 3. 1% to 17.8%.
It is particularly striking that incentives also have a strong impact on females, since women are
sometimes said to have less flexibility. It is true that women from Java/Bali schools are on
average less willing to volunteer for remoter posts (compare the columns "Java male 12" and
"Java female 12"). Nevertheless, there was a substantial reponse to the introduction of improved
incentives: the proportion willing to go to Outer Island nonremote posts increased from 5.8% to
28.1%; the proportion willing to go to very remote posts increased from 3.5% to 9.5%.
2) Graduates of outer island medical schools are substantially more likely to volunteer for
service in remote areas than graduates of Java/Bali schools.
This effect is large, statistically significant at the .001 level, ancl  especially true in the absence of
incentives.  In batch 12, for instance, the predicted probability of volunteering for a remote or
very remote post is 75% for an outer island male graduate, against 17% for a Java/Bali male
graduate.  Among women in batch 12, 46% of outer island graduates were predicted to choose
outer island remote posts, as opposed to just  5% of Java/Bali graduates.  The introduction of
improved incentives reduces, but does not eliminate, the differential between outer island and
Java/Bali graduates.
Differentials by public vs. private schooling
In the estimates for batch 13 males, a dummy for private school attendance enters positively and
significantly in the equations for nonremote and remote outer island assignments.  For batch 12
males, the dummy is positive and significant in the nonremote outer island equation, negative and
significant in the very remote outer island equation.  The variable is nowhere significant in the
estimates for females.  The predicted impacts for males, batch 13, are shown in figure 2.  Other
things equal, males from JavalBali private schools are slightly rnore  willing to volunteer for outer
island posts, but less willing to volunteer for very remote postings (18% vs. 25%).
Marital status and children
13The effects of marital status and children are weaker thaii might be expected.  It is clear from the
coefficient estimates that married women with children do not volunteer for posts in very remote
areas.  Otherwise, however, there are no statistically significant effects of current marital status
on women's willingness to volunteer for remote postings.  However, it may well be the case that
it is expectations about marriage and children which matter, not current status.  At this stage in
their life cycle, many doctors may anticipate marrying at about the same time that they undertake
their compulsory service.
Other things equal, currently married men are less willing to volunteer for nonremote outer island
and remote outer island posts.  For males from Java/Bali schools, being married reduces
willingess to go to any outer island post from 68% to 48%.
Effect of age and time since graduation
In the batch 12 results, age and graduation year had small, statistically insignificant impacts.  In
batch 13, however, the impacts are profound. Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities by
gender for graduates of Java/Bali schools for three age/graduation date combinations.  (The
columns are labeled by gender, m/f; age in 1996: and graduation year of  '90 or '96.) The results
suggest that recent (1996) graduates are far more responsive to incentives than earlier graduates
(1990).  This is highly plausible, since the latter are more likely to have developed family and
employment ties which reduce their flexibility. Age independently reduces the willingness to
volunteer for outer island remote postings.
Summary
Tying service in remote areas to subsequent civil service appointment was, according to this
analysis, sufficient to drastically boost the willingess of graduates of Java/Bali schools to serve in
outer island and remote areas.  However, the post-incentive willingess of these graduates to serve
in remote areas was lower than the pre-incentive willingness of graduates from schools in the
outer islands.
14Compare  Batch  12 & Batch 13 on predicted  probability
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16TABLE 1: CHOICES BY STUDENTS OF LOCATIONS FOR PTT SERVICE
BATCH  12: STUDENTS  FROM  JAWA/BALI  SCHOOLS
Outer  Islands
I  Jawa/Bali  biasa  terpencil  sangat  terp.  Total
…__________+____________________________________________+_-_-…_____
male  1  169  15  18  12  1  214
1  78.97  7.01  8.41  5.61  1  100.00
___________+____________________________________________+…_________
femalel  202  23  9  4  1  238
1  84.87  9.66  3.78  1.68  1  100.00
___________+_____________________________________--------_+-______
Totall  371  38  27  16  1  452
1  82.08  8.41  5.97  3.54  1  100.00
BATCH  13: STUDENTS  FROM  JAWA/BALI  SCHOOLS
Outer  Islands
I  Jawa/Bali  biasa  Terpencil  sangat  terp.  Total
----------- +_____________________________--  - - ------  +  …_________
male  1  63  47  55  43  1  208
I  30.29  22.60  26.44  20.67  1  100.00
___________+____________________________________________+_________-
female  1  68  53  18  10  1  149
1  45.64  35.57  12.08  6.71  1  100.00
…__  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _+…__  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  +…__  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Totall  131  100  73  53  1  357
1  36.69  28.01  20.45  14.85  1  100.00
BATCH  12: STUDENTS  FROM  OUTER  ISLAND  SCHOOLS
I  Outer  Islands
I  Jawa/Bali  biasa  terpencil  sangat  terp.  Total
_________  -_+--_____________________________+  …_________
male  1  8  18  29  22  1  77
1  10.39  23.38  37.66  28.57  1  100.00
…----------+_____________________________---------------____+…_____
female  1  12  26  20  1  1  59
1  20.34  44.07  33.90  1.69  1  100.00
…--  - - - - - - - -+  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ +…__  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Totall  20  44  49  23  1  136
1  14.71  32.35  36.03  16.91  1  100.00
BATCH  13:  STUDENTS  FROM  OUTER  ISLAND  SCHOOLS
Outer  Islands
I  Jawa/Bali  biasa  terpencil  sangat  terp.  Total
----------- +___________________________________.…________+  …_________
male  1  3  49  67  60  1  179
1  1.68  27.37  37.43  33.52  1  100.00
----------- +-___________________________________.________+_________-
female  1  3  74  59  11  1  147
1  2.04  50.34  40.14  7.48  1  100.00
…__________+_____  ___--___________________.--_____+  …_________
Totall  6  123  126  71  1  326
1.  1.84  37.73  38.65  21.78  1  100.00
175. STATED PREFERENCE  ANALYSIS
Background and motivation
The stated-preference  analysis  was designed  to answer  questions  which  could not be answered
with the revealed  preference  analysis,  in particular:
*  How responsive  are doctors  to increased  salary  incentives,  as opposed  to the incentive  of
civil service  appointment?
*  Is the civil service  appointment  attractive  mostly  because  of the educational  benefits  it
provides,  or also because  of the security  and status  of civil service  positions?
*  Holding  constanit  the province  of assignment,  what  are the preferences  of doctors  for
different degrees  of remoteness?
The large  sample  of the stated-preference  survey  also allows  a more  detailed  look at the influence
of doctor  characteristics  on doctor  preferences.
Sample
The  stated-preference  survey  was targeted  on final-year  medical  students,  who would  be shortly
facing  the task of choosinig  locations  for their compulsory  medical  service. The survey  covered
14  of lndoniesia's  32 medical  schiools,  a group  comprising  70%  of all graduates 3. It encompassed
public  and private schiools,  and included  three off-Java  schools  . The survey  was administered  to
585 final-year  students. An effort  was made  to recruit as many  respondents  as possible;
randomness  of selection  was  therefore  sacrificed  in order  to maximize  sample  size. Surveys  were
administered  examination-style  to groups  of students;  discussion  was  prohibited  during survey
administration. Surveys  were conducted  over the period  May-June  1997.
Instrument
The survey instrument  consisted  of two parts:  a set of choice tasks,  and a series  of background
questions  on respondent  characteristics  (see appendix  B). Each  respondent  faced  a set of
eighteen  choice  tasks. Each  task consisted  of a choice between  two hypothetical  job assignments.
Based  on  the latest  available  data,  for 1994.  Seven  newly-founded  schools  had  no graduates  during  that
year.
18An assignment was defined by a combination of seven attributes, each with a range of values as
follows:
Attribute  Range
Province  Jakarta, Central Java, South Sulawesi, Northern Sumatra, Central
Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara, Irian Jaya
Remoteness  non-remote, remote, or very remolte.
Total monthly income  from Rp.  500,000 (approx. $200)
to  Rp. 3,000,000  (approx. $1200)
Length of contract  1, 2, or 3 years
Probability of subsequent  from 10% to 90%
appointment to the civil
service
Probability of subsequent  from 10% to 90%
specialist training  I
An important feature of this framework is the delinking of specialist training from civil service.
In practice, these two benefits have always been linked. We know from the revealed preference
analysis that the combination of the two serves as a powerful incentive. This analysis allows us
to assess the separate impact of each benefit.
EXAMPLE;  OF A CHOICE TASK
Pilihan  yang mana  lebih  disukai?  Lingkari  I atau 2.
Which choice  doyou  prefer?  Circle I or 2.
Propinsi  (Province)  Kalimantan  Tengah  Nusa  Tgara  T  r
Keterpencilan  (remoteness)  Terpe0#ncilrmote)  Sna  pe  e  remote%
Tempat ker]a (workplace)_  Puskemas(  ealtcter,)  Pusesms00  ath0  eter)
Lama ikatan kerja (contract  2 tahun  I  tahun 
length)  (2 years)  (1  year,i
Pendapatan/hulan,  semua  Rpl2.500S000  3.0;00M00u0
sumber (monthly income, all
sources)  :  X__________:____:_:_________
Kemungkinan diangkat Pgawa  70%  50%
Negeri (probability of
appointment  as a civilservant)  _______::  ___________:______
Kemungkinan  spesialisasi  50%  90%
(probability  of specialist  training)  _  :_  __D;
Box 1
Some combinations of attributes were prohibited as impossible, for instance  remote or very
remote health centers in Jakarta.  (See  Annex B4.) The combinations of attributes were randomly
generated using the Choice-Based-Conjoint program (Sawtooth Software, n.d.).  Fifty different
19sets of eighteen tasks were generated.  An example of a choice task is shown in Box 1.
Instructions to the respondents are reproduced in appendix B3.
Results
Four models were run, for each combination of gender and outer island vs. Java/Bali birthplace.
The basic independent variables were differences between choice I and choice 2 in the seven
attributes listed above. In addition, private school was interacted with the income, civil service,
and specialist training difference variables; the characteristic, "grew up in rural areas or a small
town" was interacted with the difference in the very remote and remote dummies; a dummy for
"ever failed a course" was interacted with probability of specialist training; and difference
variables were created for the variables homeprov and schoolprov.  Homeprov (schoolprov) took
the value I if the assignment province (school province) was the same as the respondent's
birthprovince, zero otherwise.  Statistically insignificant interaction variables were dropped from
the equations, which were then rerun4. Final estimates are shown in appendix table 4.  The
robust standard errors allow for intercorrelation among the errors of the 18 responses of a
particular respondent. The equations were extremely statistically significant.  Approximately 77%
of all responses are correctly predicted by the equations. 5
The coefficients are almost all plausible and statistically significant. A useful way interpreting
them is to express the utility or disutility of each attribute in terms of monetary equivalents.  For
instance, if the estimated utility function is:
U= 10*(salary  in thousand rupiahs/mo) - 2000 (contract length in years) +
50000(probability  of specialist training)
then:
*  a one year decrease in the contract length is equivalent to a Rp 200 (==2000/1  0) thousand
increase in monthly salary; i.e. the cash equivalent of an additional year of contract length is
Rp-200,000 (the minus sign indicates that contract length is a disamenity, something that is
disliked)
4  Some  alternative  specifications,  including  logarithmic  terms in income,  and interactions  of contract
length  with remoteness  of location,  did not provide  better  explanatory  power.
5 Keep  in mind  that about 50% of the responses  could  be correctly  predicted  either  randomly,  or by always
choosing  '1'.
20*  certainty of receiving specialist training is equivalent to a Rp 5000 (=50000/10) thousand
increase in monthly salary; i.e., the cash equivalent of specialty training is Rp 5
million/month.
TABLE OF COMPENSATING  DIFFERENTIALS
This  table  shows  compensating  differentials  based  on  the  coefficients  of  appendix  table  4. Locational
preferences  are  relative  to  a private  health  clinic  in Jakarta.  Figures  shown  in  italics  are  noit  significantly
different  from  zero 6. Note  that  some  private  school  coefficients  are  constrained  to be  equal  to  the
corresponding  public  school  coefficients.
Gender  Male  Male  Female  Female  Male  Male  Female  Female
Birthplace  Java  Java  Java  Java  Outer  Is  Outer Is  Outer  Is  Outer  Is
Pub/  Public  Private  Public  Private  Public  Private  Public  Private
private
Length  -187  -1,279  -429  -842  +18  -443  -339
(years)  I
PNS  2189  17  2691  2691  2604  1406  4234  1708
Specialist  9247-  20809-  11349-  11349-  12489..  13859-  11324-  11324-
training  200*age  450*ag  255*age  255*age  322*age  322*age  289*age  289*age
e
Biasa  36  82  20  20  +272  +272  +539  +539
Terpencil  -91  -205  -1303  -1303  -63  -63  -339  -339
Sangat  -974  -2194  -3066  -3066  -615  -615  -1475  -1475
Terpencil
post in  442  995  835  835  954  954  1821  1821
province of
schooling
JaTeng  -246  -555  +873  +873  0  0  -207  -207
KalTeng  -1147  -2514  -1155  -1155  +125  +125  -762  -762
SulSel  -829  -1867  -1089  -1089  -263  -263  -1262  -1262
NTT  -935  -2105  -1061  -1061  -237  -237  -1619  -1619
SumUt  -484  -1088  -727  -727  +39  +39  -748  -748
IrJa  -1982  -4462  -3059  -3059  -500  -500  -2472  -2472
6 These  significance  statements  are made  on the basis of the coefficient  of the variable  in question;  they
should  properly  be based  on the ratio  of that coefficient  to the coefficient  of salary.
21The results are organized in the table of compensating differentials. Consider the first column,
referring to male public school graduates from Java/Bali.  On average within this group, and
holding location, career prospects and all else equal, graduates would be willing to forgo Rp
187,000 /month in income in order to reduce contract length by one year.  (It is important to
remember that this represents median preferences -- some would accept a smaller reduction,
others would demand a larger one). Private school graduates (second column) have a much
higher disutility for contract length.  For them, a year of reduced service is worth almost Rp 1.3
million/month.
A large value is attached to civil service appointment by public school graduates, even in the
absence of specialist training.  An increase in the probability of appointment from 0% to 100% is
valued on average at Rp 2,189,000/month by male public school graduates from Java/Bali.
Continuing down the first column, males from Java/Bali place an extremely high value on
specialist training.  On average, a 25 year old graduate values this at Rp 4,247,000/month. This is
quite reasonable given the increase in earnings associated with specialist education. Value
declines with age, reflecting the shorter working lifetime of the training, and perhaps the
perceived chance of being deemed to old to enter specialist training.
As expected, a huge disutility is attached to very remote (sangat terpencil)  location -- this
requires a compensating differential of nearly a million rupiah/month, compared to service in a
nonremote private clinic.  Surprisingly, however, there is no significant disutility attached to
service in remote or nonremote health centers relative to nonremote private clinics, controlling
for province.  This is the most unexpected finding of the analysis.
The relative magnitudes of the disutilities attached to the provinces are in accord with popular
perceptions of the desirability of these postings for a cosmopolitan Javanese.  Central Java is
rated as 'worth'  Rp 246,000/month less than Jakarta (the comparison location) to a public school
graduate, though this difference is not statistically significant. Northern Sumatra, which boasts a
large metropolis with good career prospects, has a relatively low disutility attached to it.  The
remote provinces of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and Central Kalimantan (KalTeng) require
compensating differentials of about Rp 1 million/month.  Irian Jaya, the province with the most
challenging conditions, requires a differential of nearly Rp 2 million /month, in addition to the
22differentials for very remote locations.  A post in the province of schooling is considered worth
Rp. 442,000/month.  (A separate variable for posting in home province was not significant.)
The second column repeats these calculations for male private school graduates from Java/Bali.
There are some striking differences.  Essentially no value is attached to a civil service
appointment by itself (as opposed to specialist training).  The cornpensating differential attached
to length of service is very high: Rp -1,279,000/month, versus Rp -187,000 for the public school
counterparts.  The differentials attached to service in more remote provinces are about twice as
high as those for the public school graduates. Posting in the province of schooling (likely to also
be the student's home province) is valued at almost Rp I million/month.
The third column describes the preferences of female public school graduates from Java/Bali.
Compared to their male counterparts, they have a higher disutility for contract length, with an
additional year equivalent to a loss of Rp 429,000/month.  As with the males, they place a very
high value both on civil service appointment and on specialist training.  The locational values
show interesting, and expected, contrasts with the males. Unlike the males, the females place a
very high disutility on remote (terpencil) locations: these carry a disutility equivalent to a loss of
Rp 1,303,000/month.  Very remote locations carry an immense penalty of over Rp 3
million/month, three times the disutility expressed by males.  The province-specific values are
similar to those of the males, with two differences.  First, the females actually have a strong
preference for Central Java relative to Jakarta.  Second, they have on average a much stronger
distaste for service in Irian Jaya.  Service at a very remote location in Irian Jaya would require a
compensating differential of more than Rp 6 million/month in cash, in order to be equivalent to a
nonremote post in Jakarta.
Turning now to outer island male public school graduates (column 5), there are some interesting
contrasts with their Java-born counterparts.  The outer island males do not attach any significant
disutility to contract length. They prefer nonremote health centers to nonremote private clinics.
The disutility they attach to very remote locations (Rp -615,000/rnonth) is one-third less than
their Javan counterparts.  The province-specific disutilities are quite low compared to the Javans:
there is essentially no disutility attached to service in Central Kalimantan, and only Rp -
500,000/month for service in Irian Jaya. Finally, outer island females are intermediate between
Javan males and Javan females in terms of their disutility for remote and very remote posts.
23Outer island females place an extremely higih  premium oni  service in their province of schooling
(Rp 1.8 million/month), but they also place a higih  premium on service in their birth province (Rp
1,082,000/monthi,  not shown in table).
Discussion
There are several potential sources of bias in these results.  First, the respondents may not have
understood, or complied with, the instructionis  regarding the choice scenario.  For instance, they
may believe that choice of a remote location would in fact increase their chance of receiving
specialist training, regardless of the probability assigned in the choice task.  Second, the
respondents may have strategic reasons for misstating their preferences.  They may believe, for
instance, that they can influence public policy in their favor by overstating the salary or training
benefits necessary to induce service in remote areas.  Or they may believe that 'socially
acceptable'  responses indicating willingness to serve in remote areas will in some way yield
individual or group benefits.
One way to check the results is to compare them to the revealed preference analysis.  There is
strong qualitative consistency between the two analyses.  Both shiow  similar differentials in
preferences between males and females, between outer island and Java/Bali graduates, and
among age or graduation groups.  Both show very strong responsiveness to civil-service related
incentives.  In particular, the increase between batches 12 and 13 in preferences for outer island
nonremote and remote locations -- despite the relatively small probabilities of civil service
appointment (10% and 50%) -- is consistent with the relatively low disutilities estimated for these
positions (except in the least preferred provinces). If there is bias in the results, it is difficult to
know in which direction it goes. Consequently, a conservative approach to interpreting the
compensating differentials is to accept relative magnitudes, but be cautious about absolute
magnitudes.
A drawback of the compensating differentials estimates is that, by definition, they describe the
value at which respondents with specified characteristics would divide themselves evenly
between the two alternatives given.  Since doctors may vary in their tastes, it would be of interest
to determine how the proportion of doctors choosing, say, service in Irian Jaya as salary
increases. This is a complex computational task; our results allow us easily to estimate the
24proportion who would choose Irian Jaya over Jakarta if there were only those two choices.  Of,
course, in practice the doctor must choose among a large number of alternatives; our task is to
calculate the probability of choosinig  each alternative from the complete set, given the predicted
preferences between each pair of alternatives.  To do this properl  y requires a more detailed
treatment of heterogeneity of tastes, and will be a topic for follow-on work.
Policy implications
1. Problems with the current situation.
There are two problems.  First, compulsory service is inequitable for medical students, mostly
females, who are unable to accept remote or distant postings. The burden imposed by these
postings is evident in the huge disutilities attached to these postings-- compulsory service in a
very remote area is viewed as equivalent to a 'tax' of Rp 4 million or more a month.  These
graduates are faced with an unattractive set of alternatives: indefinite unemployment, illegal work
as a doctor, or abandonment of their training in favor of a nonmedical career.  Alternatively, if
public authorities waive the rules and allow these graduates to satisfy their compulsory service in
Jakarta or West Java, other graduates may perceive this as inequitable.
Second, providing specialist training as an incentive is not only expensive, but inefficient.
Doctors who are particularly interested in specialist training may not be much interested in, or
suited for, public health work in remote areas. Furthermore, delaying entry into specialist
training by three years (of compulsory service)  means that doctors do not complete that training
until their late thirties or early forties.  This significantly reduces the private and social returns to
that training.
2. Possible modifications of the current policy
a)  The estimates suggest that incentive payments for very remote (sangat terpencil) service of
the order of Rp I to 1.5 million/month would be attractive to the imedian  outer island male
graduate. Based on a three year contract, this is less expensive, from the government's  point of
view, than the cost of paying for specialist training for 90% of these doctors7. The current total
W  we are assuming  that government  or social  costs  of specialist  training  at public  universities  are
comparable  to those  at private  universities,  estimated  at about Rp  60 million.
25supply of outer island male graduates is about 380/year, and the annual number of sangat
terpencil posts open is approximately 200.
b)  However, if the supply of outer island graduates is insufficient to fill the vacancies, then it
would be necessary to continue to offer specialist training in order to induce many Javans to work
in very remote areas.  Cash incentives for graduates from Java would be more expensive thall this
training incentive. The results suggest that it is not necessary to offer a civil service appointment
in addition to the specialist training, however.
c)  Remote (te,pencil,  as opposed to very remote) posts in the outer islands can be filled by male
public school graduates from Java with a salary bonus of about Rp I million/month (above
Jakarta private wages -- making a total of about Rp 2 million/month), and from outside Java for a
much smaller bonus, of perhaps Rp 300,000 for most provinces. The latter is much smaller, and
the former is comparable to, the cost of the current policy of providing specialist training to 50%
of the doctors in these posts.
d) The above policy could be integrated with one offering indefinite contract renewals to PTT
doctors now serving in remote and very remote areas. A companion survey will provide data on1
the potential cost and impact of this policy.
e) Perhaps most importantly, both the revealed preference and stated preference results
emphasize the much greater willingness of people from the outer islands to serve in remote and
very remote locations. This suggests very substantial gains to increasing the representation of
outer island students in medical schools. This might be accomplished by scholarships and
assistance in pre-university preparation.
f) It has frequently been suggested that public healtlh  graduates might be trained as healtlh  center
managers, as an alternative to using physicians as managers.  The results presented here would
encourage the establishment of such training programs in the outer islands, or for students from
the outer islands. These students, lacking the urban employment prospects of doctors, would be
expected to be even more willing to volunteer for remote and very remote service than outer
island medical students.
g) Concurrently with the above policy changes, compulsory service for doctors might be
abandoned, at least for students at private schools and for students at public schlools  willing to
pay unsubsidized tuition fees.
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27a)  APPENDIX  TABLE  1: VARIABLE  DEFINITIONS  AND  STATISTICS,  REVEALED
PREFERENCE  ANALYSIS
A.  DEFINITIONS
age:  age  in  1996
marital:  dummy,  married
children:  number  of children
oi sch:  dummy,  medical  school  outside  Java/Bali
priv  sch:  dummy,  private  medical  school
spdoctor:  dummy,  spouse  is a doctor
graduyr3:  year  of graduation
B. BATCH  12, MALES
Variable  I  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
…________+…____________________________________________________
age  283  29.49823  3.008704  26  49
MARITAL  283  .3038869  .4607492  0  1
CHILDREN  I  283  .2155477  .6009791  0  5
oi  sch  1  283  .2720848  .4458217  0  1
priv_sch  1  283  .2897527  .4544511  0  1
SPDOCTOR  283  .04947  .2172313  0  1
graduyr3  283  94.72438  .6316189  90  95
C. BATCH  12, FEMALES
Variable  I  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
…________+…____________________________________________________
age  1  290  29.21034  3.096023  25  44
MARITAL  290  .5068966  .5008167  0  1
CHILDREN  290  .3068966  .6326913  0  3
oi_sch  290  .2  .4006914  0  1
priv_sch  1  290  .3827586  .4869003  0  1
SPDOCTOR  I  290  .0931034  .2910796  0  1
graduyr3  1  290  94.57931  .8738331  89  95
D. BATCH  13, MALES
Variable  I  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
…________+…____________________________________________________
age  383  28.83812  2.865193  24  43
MARITAL  I  383  .2872063  .4530505  0  1
CHILDREN  I  383  .227154  .6536999  0  5
oi_sch  1  383  .464752  .4994084  0  1
priv_sch  1  383  .2114883  .4088979  0  1
SPDOCTOR  I  383  .0809399  .2730996  0  1
graduyr3  1  383  95.12272  .9588829  89  96
E. BATCH  13,  FEMALES
Variable  I  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
_ _ _ _ _ _ _  _-+…--  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
age  1  295  28.19322  2.728027  24  44
MARITAL  I  295  .4338983  .4964535  0  1
CHILDREN  I  295  .2677966  .6542485  0  4
oi_sch  1  295  .4983051  .5008467  0  1
priv  sch  1  295  .2542373  .4361715  0  1
SPDOCTOR  295  .1491525  .3568441  0  1
graduyr3  1  295  95  1.020204  88  96
28APPENDIX TABLE 2A
BATCH 12 MALES
Multinomial  regression  Number  of  obs  =  283
chi2(21)  =  152.67
Prob  >  chi2  =  0.0000
Log  Likelihood  =  -233.8589  Pseudo  R2  =  0.2461
-------------------------------------------------------------------- __-------_
provrmtl  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>lzl  [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------- +-______--__________________________________________--_______________
Outer  Island  nonremote
age  1  -.1241292  .1044222  -1.189  0.235  -.328793  .0805346
MARITAL  1  .557725  .5721089  0.975  0.330  -.5635879  1.679038
CHILDREN  I  -.462538  .5393669  -0.858  0.391  -1.519678  .5946017
oi_sch  1  3.850212  .6010213  6.406  0.000  2.672232  5.028192
priv  sch  1  1.336518  .5540064  2.412  0.016  .2506859  2.422351
SPDOCTOR  1  -.3850349  1.183606  -0.325  0.745  -2.704859  1.934789
graduyr3  1  -.3030369  .3156624  -0.960  0.337  -.9217239  .31565
-cons  1  29.15078  30.731  0.949  0.343  -31.08088  89.38245
________-+------------------------------------------_.---__----------_________
Outer  Island  remote
age  1  -.1405831  .1114062  -1.262  0.207  -.3589352  .077769
MARITAL  1  -.2557866  .6241109  -0.410  0.682  -1.479021  .9674483
CHILDREN  1  -.9073868  .7688577  -1.180  0.238  -2.41432  .5995466
oi_sch  1  3.77406  .5391176  7.000  0.000  2.717409  4.830711
priv  sch  1  .2704817  .5528874  0.489  0.625  -.8131577  1.354121
SPDOCTOR  1  .6502684  1.041951  0.624  0.533  -1.391919  2.692455
graduyr3  1  .3249293  .4803456  0.676  0.499  -.6165308  1.266389
cons  1  -29.00467  45.86409  -0.632  0.527  -118.8966  60.88729
________-+------------------------------------------_----__----------_________
Outer  Island  very  remote
age  1  .0332398  .109213  0.304  0.761  -.1808136  .2472933
MARITAL  1  -.6785836  .6438654  -1.054  0.292  -1.940537  .5833695
CHILDREN  1  -.0048397  .4625567  -0.010  0.992  -.9114342  .9017548
oi_sch  1  3.542948  .5598649  6.328  0.000  2.445633  4.640263
priv_sch  I  -1.674387  .8723153  -1.919  0.055  -3.384094  .0353197
SPDOCTOR  1  -44.20309  . . . .
graduyr3  1  -.3902734  .3429819  -1.138  0.255  -1.062506  .2819588
cons  1  33.87223  33.1551  1.022  0.307  -31.11058  98.85503
---------------------------------------------------------- __-----------------_
(Outcome  provrmtl==Jawa  & B is the  comparison  group)
29APPENDIX TABLE 2B
BATCH  12, FEMALES
Multinomial  regression  Number  of  obs  =  290
chi2(21)  = 115.46
Prob  >  chi2  = 0.0000
Log  Likelihood  =  -182.25407  Pseudo  R2  =  0.2406
provrmtl  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>Izl  [95% Conf.  Interval]
Outer  Island  nonremote
age  I  .013778  .0811935  0.170  0.865  -.1453583  .1729143
MARITAL  I  -.3688953  .4796584  -0.769  0.442  -1.309009  .5712179
CHILDREN  I  .2448923  .3496392  0.700  0.484  -.440388  .9301725
oi sch  1  3.437769  .4760645  7.221  0.000  2.504699  4.370838
priv_sch  I  .5789649  .4831991  1.198  0.231  -.3680879  1.52601-8
SPDOCTOR  1.492807  .60046  2.486  0.013  .3159273  2.669687
graduyr3  -.2098006  .2029136  -1.034  0.301  -.607504  .1879028
-cons  16.83452  19.87388  0.847  0.397  -22.11757  55.7866
…--------+-___________________________________________________________________
Outer  Island  remote
age  I  .1330548  .0994033  1.339  0.181  -.0617721  .3278817
MARITAL  I  -1.093825  .641113  -1.706  0.088  -2.350383  .1627334
CHILDREN  I  .1503781  .4951581  0.304  0.761  -.820114  1.12087
oi_sch  I  3.802586  .5881998  6.465  0.000  2.649736  4.955436
priv_sch  -.6060551  .7069732  -0.857  0.391  -1.991697  .779587
SPDOCTOR  1.559218  .948813  1.643  0.100  -.300421  3.418857
graduyr3  1  -.0578562  .3555778  -0.163  0.871  -.754776  .6390635
-cons  1  -1.149503  34.18644  -0.034  0.973  -68.1537  65.8547
--------- +-------------------------------------…------------__----____________
Outer  Island  very  remote
age  I  -.093665  .3433381  -0.273  0.785  -.7665954  .5792655
MARITAL  1  -21.81218  1.198711  -18.196  0.000  -24.16161  -19.46274
CHILDREN  -39.80506  1.25e+09  0.000  1.000  -2.45e+09  2.45e+09
oi_sch  1.401955  1.250433  1.121  0.262  -1.048849  3.852759
priv  sch  1  -.6333743  1.426186  -0.444  0.657  -3.428648  2.161899
SPDOCTOR  I  22.55989  . . . .
graduyr3  I  .3836602  1.07136  0.358  0.720  -1.716167  2.483487
-cons I  -36.92709  103.6514  -0.356  0.722  -240.0801  166.2259
(Outcome  provrmtl==Jawa  &  B is the  comparison  group)
30APPENDIX  TABLE  2C
BATCH 13, MALES
Multinomial  regression  Number  of obs  =  383
chi2(21)  =  143.56
Prob  >  chi2  =  0.0000
Log  Likelihood  =  -449.86333  Pseudo  R2  =  0.1376
provrmtl  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>Iz|  [95% Conf.  Interval]
Outer  Island  nonremote
age  I  -.1111011  .0883762  -1.257  0.209  -.2843153  .0621132
MARITAL  -.9645574  .5889225  -1.638  0.101  -2.118824  .1897094
CHILDREN  I  .2506882  .4874255  0.514  0.607  -.7046482  1.206025
oi_sch  1  3.685305  .7065425  5.216  0.000  2.300507  5.070103
priv_sch  1.433465  .5008063  2.862  0.004  .4519027  2.415027
SPDOCTOR  .7825769  .7323342  1.069  0.285  -.6527717  2.217925
graduyr3  1  .7742842  .2330639  3.322  0.001  .3174874  1.231081
cons  I  -70.91739  22.88618  -3.099  0.002  -115.7735  -26.06129
…--------+-___________________________________________________________________
Outer  Island  remote
age  I  -.2055039  .0901082  -2.281  0.023  -.3821126  -.0288951
MARITAL  I  -1.401922  .6110201  -2.294  0.022  -2.599499  -.2043445
CHILDREN  .4401251  .4939446  0.891  0.373  -.5279886  1.408239
oi_sch  1  3.722087  .6970834  5.340  0.000  2.355828  5.088345
priv  sch  I  .8937679  .5079367  1.760  0.078  -. 1017698  1.889306
SPDOCTOR  I  .9549834  .7578044  1.260  0.208  -.5302859  2.440253
graduyr3  1  .5810809  .218274  2.662  0.008  .1532717  1.00889
-cons  I  -49.44252  21.49635  -2.300  0.021  -91.5746  -7.310448
--------- +…___________________________________________________________________
Outer  Island  very  remote
age  I  .0014752  .0854615  0.017  0.986  -.1660261  .1689766
MARITALI  -.3871185  .5524567  -0.701  0.483  -1.469914  .6956767
CHILDREN  I  .1742179  .4723127  0.369  0.712  -.7514981  1.099934
oi_sch  1  3.526986  .6991653  5.045  0.000  2.156647  4.897325
priv  sch  I  .4040116  .5191938  0.778  0.436  -.6135895  1.421613
SPDOCTOR  -1.970863  1.182279  -1.667  0.096  -4.288088  .3463611
graduyr3  1  1.024132  .2423728  4.225  0.000  .5490897  1.499174
-cons  -97.61006  23.76774  -4.107  0.000  -144.194  -51.02614
(Outcome  provrmtl==Jawa  &  B is the  comparison  group)
31APPENDIX TABLE 2D
BATCH 13, FEMALES
Multinomial  regression  Number  of  obs  =  295
chi2(21)  =  145.09
Prob  >  chi2  =  0.0000
Log  Likelihood  =  -294.10069  Pseudo  R2  =  0.1979
provrmtl  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>IZI  [95% Conf.  Interval]
Outer  island  nonremote
age  I  -.1189277  .0936575  -1.270  0.204  -.3024931  .0646376
MARITAL  I  .0359726  .5088964  0.071  0.944  -.9614459  1.033391
CHILDREN  .0711081  .3554449  0.200  0.841  -.6255511  .7677673
oi_sch  3.82478  .6972768  5.485  0.000  2.458143  5.191418
priv  sch  I  .6348682  .5045185  1.258  0.208  -.3539698  1.623706
SPDOCTOR  I  .833417  .5787424  1.440  0.150  -.3008973  1.967731
graduyr3  I  .5998963  .2214786  2.709  0.007  .1658063  1.033986
-cons  1  -54.20297  21.7051  -2.497  0.013  -96.74419  -11.66175
--------- +…___________________________________________________________________
Outer  Island  remote
age  I  -.1335339  .1093644  -1.221  0.222  -.3478842  .0808164
MARITAL  I  -.7044551  .6165873  -1.143  0.253  -1.912944  .5040337
CHILDREN  I  .1420596  .4351483  0.326  0.744  -.7108153  .9949345
oi  sch  1  4.928999  .7504803  6.568  0.000  3.458085  6.399913
priv  sch  1  .7270435  .6213775  1.170  0.242  -.490834  1.944921
SPDOCTOR  2.103193  .7086708  2.968  0.003  .7142236  3.492162
graduyr3  1  .9449086  .3007622  3.142  0.002  .3554256  1.534392
-cons  1  -87.82871  29.26284  -3.001  0.003  -145.1828  -30.4746
--------- +…___________________________________________________________________
Outer  Island  very  remote
age  I  -.0321541  .1300435  -0.247  0.805  -.2870347  .2227266
MARITAL  |  -.8309908  .8888162  -0.935  0.350  -2.573038  .9110568
CHILDREN  I  -37.65063  1.21e+08  0.000  1.000  -2.38e+08  2.38e+08
oi_sch  1  3.505597  .8378328  4.184  0.000  1.863475  5.147719
priv  sch  .2755101  .8430683  0.327  0.744  -1.376874  1.927894
SPDOCTOR  1.03143  1.153166  0.894  0.371  -1.228735  3.291594
graduyr3  .7891714  .4251077  1.856  0.063  -.0440243  1.622367
cons  I  -75.77971  41.28481  -1.836  0.066  -156.6964  5.137018
---------------------------------------------------------- __-----------------_
(Outcome  provrmtl==Jawa  & B  is the  comparison  group)
32APPENDIX  TABLE  3: STATED  PREFERENCE  VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION
VARIABLE  DEFINITIONS
Examples:  dlama=  delta  contract  length  =
contract  length  in alternative  1 - contract  length  in alterntative  2
djat  = JATENG1-JATENG2
where  JATENGi=l  if alternative  i is in Central  Java,  =0 otherwise
35. dlama  delta  contract  length
36.  dgaji  delta  salary,  00ORp/mo
37.  dpns  delta  civil  service  probability
38.  dspe  delta  specialist  probability
39.  dbias  delta  nonremote
40.  dterp  delta  remote
42.  djat  delta  Central  Java
43.  dkalt  delta  Central  Kalimantan
44.  dsuls  delta  South  Sulawesi
45.  dntt  delta  East  Nusa  Tenggara
46.  dsumut  delta  North  Sumatra
47.  dirja  delta  Irian  Jaya
74.  s dlama  private  school*delta  contract  length
75.  s_dgaji  private  school  *delta  salary,  00ORp/mo
76.  s_dpns  private  school*delta  civil  service  probability
77.  s_dspe  private  school  *delta  specialist  probability
91. dhomeprv  delta  (post=birth  province)
92.  dsekprop  delta  (post=school  province)
105.  dumurspe  delta  age  avail  for training*specialist  probability
101.  ddesst  delta  rural  background*very  remote
101.  ddesst  delta  rural  background*very  remote
106.  dluluspe  delta  ever  failed  a course*specialist  probability
33MALE  JAVA-BALI:  SUMMARY  STATISTICS
Variable  I  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
---------------------------------------------------------------
dlama  1  3690  .0520325  1.40228  -2  2
dgaji  1  3690  65.78591  1311.786  -2500  2500
dpns  1  3690  2.905149  44.91146  -80  80
dspe  1  3690  -.7750678  45.77866  -80  80
dbias  1  3690  .0168022  .7025798  -1  1
dterp  1  3690  .0192412  .7046363  -1  1
djat  1  3690  -.0075881  .5415227  -1  1
dkalt  1  3690  .0062331  .5260512  -1  1
dsuls  1  3690  -.0054201  .5455385  -1  1
dntt  3690  .0170732  .525811  -1  1
dsumut  3690  .0170732  .5380417  -1  1
dirja  3690  -.0303523  .5239197  -1  1
s_diama  3690  .0162602  .6778501  -2  2
s dgaji  1  3690  24.52575  636.872  -2500  2500
s_dpns  1  3690  1.143631  21.65536  -80  80
s dspe  1  3690  -.6287263  22.22718  -80  80
dhomeprv  1  3690  -.003252  .3192398  -1  1
dsekprop  1  3690  .001626  .362213  -1  1
dumurspe  3690  -25.26287  1305.238  -3110  2980
ddesst  1  3690  -.0081301  .3832195  -1  1
ddesst  1  3690  -.0081301  .3832195  -1  1
dluluspe  1  3690  -1.154472  35.79512  -80  80
FEMALE  JAVA-BALI:  SUMMARY  STATISTICS
Variable  I  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
_________+…____________________________________________________
dlama  1  3276  -.0128205  1.408314  -2  2
dgaji  3276  77.45726  1296.741  -2500  2500
dpns  3276  1.782662  44.34146  -80  80
dspe  3276  -1.117216  45.37448  -80  80
dbias  I  3276  .0363248  .7004202  -1  1
dterp  3276  .0155678  .7102749  -1  1
djat  3276  -.0094628  .5421773  -1  1
dkalt  1  3276  .0164835  .5251274  -1  1
dsuls  3276  -.0027473  .5411256  -1  1
dntt  3276  .0030525  .5265383  -1  1
dsumut  3276  .0128205  .5412627  -1  1
dirja  1  3276  -.0357143  .5232959  -1  1
s  dlama  1  3276  .01221  .903515  -2  2
s_dgaji  1  3276  11.5232  839.4387  -2500  2500
s_dpns  3276  .3113553  28.47408  -80  80
s_dspe  3276  -.3540904  29.47474  -80  80
dhomeprv  1  3276  .0015263  .3710897  -1  1
dsekprop  3276  .0088523  .4145238  -1  1
dumurspe  3276  -32.83272  1284.412  -2970  2870
ddesst  3276  -.009768  .2794146  -1  1
ddesst  1  3276  -.009768  .2794146  -1  1
dluluspe  1  3276  .4517705  32.66546  -80  80
34MALE  OUTER  ISLAND:  SUMMARY  STATISTICS
Variable  I  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
_________+-____________________________________________________
dlama  2016  .0287698  1.408646  -2  2
dgaji  1  2016  73.53671  1303.728  -2500  2500
dpns  2016  1.964286  44.45323  -80  80
dspe  2016  -.6746032  46.0913  -80  80
dbias  1  2016  -.0049603  .7037476  -1  1
dterp  1  2016  .0262897  .7029208  -1  1
djat  1  2016  -.0292659  .5416972  -1  1
dkalt  1  2016  .0218254  .5229425  -1  1
dsuls  1  2016  .0039683  .5401811  -1  1
dntt  2016  .0034722  .5229121  -1  1
dsumut  1  2016  .0257937  .5459795  -1  1
dirja  1  2016  -.015377  .5274233  -1  1
s dlama  1  2016  -.0059524  .6532714  -2  2
s_dgaji  1  2016  23.80952  612.8209  -2500  2500
s_dpns  2016  1.10119  20.63454  -80  80
s_dspe  1  2016  -.0396825  21.27449  -80  80
dhomeprv  1  2016  .0104167  .4448666  -1  1
dsekprop  1  2016  .0138889  .4999311  -1  1
dumurspe  1  2016  -20.59524  1339.665  -2810  2810
ddesst  1  2016  -.000496  .3707678  -1  1
ddesst  1  2016  -.000496  .3707678  -1  1
dluluspe  1  2016  -.7142857  42.65024  -80  80
FEMALE  OUTER  ISLAND:  SUMMARY  STATISTICS
Variable  I  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _+…__  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
dlama  1548  -.0180879  1.403084  -2  2
dgaji  1  1548  123.2235  1269.179  -2500  2500
dpns  1  1548  2.131783  44.61836  -80  80
dspe  1  1548  -.5167959  45.58027  -80  80
dbias  1  1548  .0691214  .698879  -1  1
dterp  1  1548  .005168  .7027321  -1  1
djat  1548  .0090439  .5392622  -1  1
dkalt  1  1548  -.0116279  .5283132  -1  1
dsuls  1  1548  -.005814  .5387071  -1  1
dntt  1  1548  .0180879  .5305737  -1  1
dsumut  1548  .0122739  .5361929  -1  1
dirja  1  1548  -.0335917  .5285961  -1  1
s_dlama  1  1548  -.0103359  .7217351  -2  2
s_dgaji  1548  45.21964  641.2277  -2500  2500
s_dpns  1  1548  .6847545  23.26423  -80  80
s_dspe  1  1548  .0904393  23.05087  -80  80
dhomeprv  1548  .0174419  .4181786  -1  1
dsekprop  1  1548  .0103359  .5096576  -1  1
dumurspe  1  1548  -13.02326  1301.994  -2820  2730
ddesst  1  1548  -.0200258  .3012355  -1  1
ddesst  1  1548  -.0200258  .3012355  -1  1
dluluspe  1548  -.6976744  39.01209  -80  80
35APPENDIX  TABLE 4: STATED PREFERENCE  ESTIMATES
4A. MALES,  JAVA-BALI
Probit  Regression  with  Huber  standard  errors  Number  of  obs  =  3690
Log  Likelihood  =-1785.0489  Pseudo  R2
Grouping  variable:  id
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------_
pill  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>Izl  [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------- +…___________________________________________________________________
dlama  1  -.0704826  .0351163  -2.007  0.045  -.1393093  -.0016559
dgaji  1  .0003754  .0000291  12.912  0.000  .0003184  .0004323
dpns  I  .0082162  .0009159  8.971  0.000  .0064211  .0100113
dspe  I  .0347098  .0116248  2.986  0.003  .0119257  .0574939
dbias  I  .0136313  .0382208  0.357  0.721  -.0612801  .0885428
dterp  I  -.0341724  .061449  -0.556  0.578  -.1546103  .0862655
dst  -.3659125  .0687266  -5.324  0.000  -.5006141  -.2312109
djat  -.0925484  .0683281  -1.354  0.176  -.2264691  .0413723
dkalt  -.4192969  .0915411  -4.580  0.000  -.5987142  -.2398796
dsuls  -.3114099  .0736019  -4.231  0.000  -.455667  -.1671528
dntt  - -.3510476  .0833915  -4.210  0.000  -.5144919  -.1876033
dsumut  I  -.1815521  .0696759  -2.606  0.009  -.3181144  -.0449897
dirja  I  -.7443214  .096986  -7.675  0.000  -.9344104  -.5542324
s_dlama  I  -.1429247  .0497177  -2.875  0.004  -.2403696  -.0454797
s_dgaji  -.0002086  .0000536  -3.894  0.000  -.0003135  -.0001036
s_dpns  I  -.005407  .0015072  -3.588  0.000  -.008361  -.002453
dsekprop  I  .1659393  .0837393  1.982  0.048  .0018132  .3300654
dumurspe  I  -.0007512  .0004064  -1.848  0.065  -.0015477  .0000454
4B.  FEMALES,  JAVA-BALI
Probit  Regression  with  Huber  standard  errors  Number  of obs  =  3276
Log  Likelihood  =-1464.7073  Pseudo  R2  =
Grouping  variable:  id
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------_
pill  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>IzI  [95% Conf.  Interval]
…--------+…___________________________________________________________________
dlama  I  -.1081921  .0383393  -2.822  0.005  -.1833358  -.0330484
dgaji  I  .0002524  .0000224  11.272  0.000  .0002085  .0002963
dpns  I  .0067926  .0006654  10.208  0.000  .0054884  .0080967
dspe  I  .0286451  .014069  2.036  0.042  .0010704  .0562199
dbias  I  .0051289  .0412365  0.124  0.901  -.0756933  .085951
dterp  I  -.3289197  .0728737  -4.514  0.000  -.4717496  -.1860897
dst  1  -.7738035  .0889796  -8.696  0.000  -.9482004  -.5994066
djat  I  .220269  .0764291  2.882  0.004  .0704706  .3700673
dkalt  -.2914487  .1100936  -2.647  0.008  -.5072282  -.0756693
dsuls  I  -.2748354  .0904313  -3.039  0.002  -.4520775  -.0975933
dntt  I  -.2678134  .1135186  -2.359  0.018  -.4903057  -.0453211
dsumut  -.1834204  .0798705  -2.296  0.022  -.3399637  -.026877
dirja  I  -.7720885  .1123198  -6.874  0.000  -.9922311  -.5519458
s_dlama  I  -.1044407  .0448962  -2.326  0.020  -.1924358  -.0164457
dhomeprv  I  .1820854  .1067371  1.706  0.088  -.0271155  .3912862
dsekprop  I  .2107087  .1057574  1.992  0.046  .003428  .4179894
dumurspe  I  -.0006431  .000503  -1.278  0.201  -.001629  .0003428
----------------------------------------------------------- __----------------6
364C.  MALES  FROM  OUTER  ISLANDS
Probit  Regression  with  Huber  standard  errors  Number  of obs  =  2016
Log  Likelihood  =-981.98104  Pseudo  R2
Grouping  variable:  id
pill  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>Izl  [95%  Conf.  Interval]
…--------+…___________________________________________________________________
dlama  I  .0070333  .0445805  0.158  0.875  -.080343  .0944095
dgaji  I  .000391  .0000365  10.714  0.000  .0003195  .0004626
dpns  .0101825  .0012098  8.417  0.000  .0078114  .0125537
dspe  I  .0488409  .0168881  2.892  0.004  .0157409  .081941
dbias  .106396  .0536511  1.983  0.047  .0012419  .2115502
dterp  -.024822  .0987274  -0.251  0.801  -.218324  .1686801
dst  -.2406674  .109521  -2.197  0.028  -.4553246  -.0260103
djat  I  .0000529  .0791665  0.001  0.999  -.1551107  .1552164
dkalt  I  .0490552  .1065622  0.460  0.645  -.159803  .2579133
dsuls  -.102688  .0924082  -1.111  0.266  -.2838048  .0784288
dntt  -.0925702  .1110943  -0.833  0.405  -.3103109  .1251706
dsumut  I  .0151435  .0750817  0.202  0.840  -.1320139  .162301
dirja  I  -.1956504  .1147449  -1.705  0.088  -.4205463  .0292455
s_dlama  I  -.1802936  .0848115  -2.126  0.034  -.3465211  -.0140661
s_dpns  I  -.0046865  .0019581  -2.393  0.017  -.0085242  -.0008487
s_dspe  .0053577  .0033587  1.595  0.111  -.0012252  .0119406
dsekprop  I  .3731865  .0861189  4.333  0.000  .2043966  .5419764
dumurspe  -.001259  .0005891  -2.137  0.033  -.0024136  -.0001044
4D.  FEMALES  FROM  OUTER  ISLANDS
Probit  Regression  with  Huber  standard  errors  Number  of  obs  1548
Log  Likelihood  = -745.2308  Pseudo  R2
Grouping  variable:  id
pill  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>Izl  [95% Conf.  Interval]
dlama  I  -.0924159  .0422767  -2.186  0.029  -.1752767  -.0095551
dgaji  .0002725  .0000332  8.197  0.000  .0002073  .0003376
dpns  I  .0115387  .001592  7.248  0.000  .0084184  .014659
dspe  I  .0308539  .0148516  2.077  0.038  .0017454  .0599625
dbias  .147008  .0616457  2.385  0.017  .0261847  .2678313
dterp  I  -.1059933  .1039206  -1.020  0.308  -.309674  .0976874
dst  I  -.4019779  .1192324  -3.371  0.001  -.6356692  -.1682867
djat  I  -.0563346  .0896582  -0.628  0.530  -.2320614  .1193923
dkalt  -.2076515  .1508219  -1.377  0.169  -.503257  .087954
dsuls  I  -.343934  .109064  -3.154  0.002  -.5576956  -.1301724
dntt  I  -.4410467  .1576276  -2.798  0.005  -.7499912  -.1321022
dsumut  I  -.2040547  .1067864  -1.911  0.056  -.4133521  .0052428
dirja  I  -. 6736021  .1497839  -4.497  0.000  -. 9671732  -. 380031
s_dpns  I  -.0068558  .0025871  -2.650  0.008  -.0119264  -.0017851
dhomeprv  .294753  .1304114  2.260  0.024  .0391514  .5503547
dsekprop  .4961757  .1066754  4.651  0.000  .2870958  .7052555
ddesterp  .3175753  .1393712  2.279  0.023  .0444128  .5907378
dumurspe  I  -. 0007887  .0005136  -1.536  0.125  -. 0017954  .000218
37APPENDIX  B 1: MEDICAL  STUDENT  SURVEY:
QUESTIONNAIRE  COVER  SHEET
Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (PB IDI)  PT CORINTHIAN Infopharma Corpora
JI. Dr. Sam Ratulangi No. 29  (A member of The CIC Consulting Group)
Jakarta 10350  Jl. Raden SaJelie  No. 46 -48 Jakana Pusat 10330
Telp. (021)  3150)679.  3900473  Telp. (021) 324335, 3150345, 3155357, 3155358
SURVEY  PREFERENSI  PENEMPATAN  I
Pengurus Besar Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (PB IDI) bekerja sama dengan PT  CORINTHIAN
Infopharma  Corpora,  a member of  the CIC  Consulting Group, suatu perusahaan  konsultan
independen  di  bidang  riset  pemasaran,  saat  ini  sedang  melakukan  penelitian  mengenai
preferensi  penempatan dokter,  dengan mahasiswa Fakultas Kedokteran tingkat  klinik sebagai
target responden.  Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui motivasi dokter untuk ditempatkan
di suatu daerah tertentu dengan  berbagai bentuk kompensasi dan  kondisi pekerjaan,  sehingga
hasil  penelitian  diharapkan  dapat  bermanfaat  bagi  pengembangan usul-usul  kebijakan  dalam
memajukan sistem penempatan dan pendayagunaan tenaga dokter di Indonesia. Oleh karena itu,
kami sangat mengharapkan kesediaan saudara sebagai sampel terpilih untuk meluangkan waktu
menjawab  pertanyaan yang  akan kami  ajukan.  Nama saudara  sebagai  responden tidak  perlu
dicantukan  sehingga kerahasiaan  identitas terjamin  dan dikemudian  hari tidak  mempengaruhi
tugas/karir  saudara. Atas kesediaan dan partisipasinya, kami ucapkan terima kasih.
A. BAGIAN PERTAMA
Wilayah  penelitian.:
1'  Medan  I-  1 Bandung  P Yogyakarta  6  Bali
4.Jakarta  . - Semarang  a Surabaya  . - - Ujung  Pandang
U-lniversitas:u;  -0;
- Unvt6ersitas  Sumatera  Utara (USU)  ;  Universitas  Tarinmanegara  (UNTAR)
li2ti  Universitas  Indonesia  (UL)  U  1  Universitas  Trisakti
C  Universitas  Padjajaran  (UNPAD)  Universitas  Yarsi
Cg  Universitas  Diponegoro  (UNDIP)  -:  -1  Universitas  Kristen  Indonesia  (UKI)
I3P  Universitas  Gajah Mada (UGM)  e7  Universitas  Kristen Krida  Wacana  UKRIDA
C3  Universitas  Airlangga  (UNAIR)  2  Universitas  Katholik  Indonesia  Atmajaya
O  Universitas  UDAYANA  L1  Universitas  lainnya
O-/a  Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS)  (sebutkan  .............. I.......  ......  .........
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APPENDIX B2:
Background questionnaire, survey of medical students
Note: a rough English translation has been added in italics
C.  l.  Tempat kelahiran responden  Kota  ............................  Propinsi .
Birthplace:  city  province
C.2.  Tahun kelahiran responden  1  l9  El
birth year
C.3.  Catat Jenis kelamin (tanpa ditanyakan):  Gender
Laki-laki male  [01]  Perempuanfemale  [02]
C.4.  Agama:  Religion
Islam  [03]  Budha  [06]
Kristen Protestan  [04]  Hindu  [07]
Katholik  [05]  ]ainnya . [081
C.5.  Status perkawinan:  marital status
Kawin married  [01]  If unmarried, continue at C.9
Belum kawin unmarried  [02]  Bila belum menikah, dilanjutkan  ke C.9
C.6.  Bila sudah menikah, apakah istri/suami* anda bekerja? (* coret yang tidak perlu)
if married, does your spouse work?
Ya  yes  [01]  Tidak  no  [02]
C.7.  Jumlah anak:  number of children  If no children, continue at C.  9
*  Belum punya anak none  [00] I  Bila belum punya anak, dilanjutkan ke C.9
*  Sudah punya anak:  one or more:
Satu orang  [Ol]  Tiga orang  [03]
Dua orang  [02]  Empat orang  [04]
Lebih dari empat more  than 4  [05]
C  .8.  Umur anak tertua : age of oldest child
Kurang dari 3 tahun < 3 yrs  [01]  7 - 8 tahun  [04]
3 -4 tahun  [02]  9 - 10 tahun  [05]
5 - 6 tahun  [03]  Lebih dari 10 tahun > 10  [06]
C.9.  Tahun masuk Universitas ? Tahun 19 OI L
Year entered  university
C. 10.  Sekarang ini, saudara sudah semester berapa ? Semester []LI
Current semester in school
C. 11.  Menurut perkiraan saudara, kapan lulus dari universitas ini ?  Tahun 19 LIE
expected  year of graduation
C. 12.  Apakah saudara pernah tidak lulus dalam mata kuliah ?
Have  you ever  failed a course?
a.  Pre Klinik  Pernah Yes  [Oll;  berapa kali ? ..number  of times  .... kali
Tidak pernah [02]
b.  Klinik  Pernah  [01];  berapa kali ? .number  of times  . kali
Tidak pernah [02]
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C. 13.  Pekerjaan orang tua:  Parent's occupation
Petani/Nelayan  [Oil  Karyawan swasta setingkat supervisor  [09]
farming/fishing  supervisory-level  employee
Pedagang  [02]  Karyawan swasta setingkat manajer  [10]
petty trade  manager
Wiraswasta (TK'  <  5 orang)  [03]  ABRI setingkat Bintara  [11]
TK = Tenaga Kerja (# employees)  armed  forces
small entrepreneur
ABRI setingkat Perwira  [12]
armed  forces
Wiraswasta (TK 5 - 50 orang)  [04]  Tenaga terampil (bengkel/elektronik/dsb)  [13]
medium entrepreneur  skilled wvorker
Wiraswasta (TK >  50 orang)  [05]  Profesional (pengacara, artis, dsb)  [14]
large entrepreneur
Pegawai negeri golongan I-If  [06]
Civil servant, lower rank  Pensiunan/Purnawirawan  [15]
Pegawai negeri golongan III-IV  [07]  retiree
Civil servant, higher rank
Lainnya (sebutkan  . ')  [16]
Karyawan swasta biasa  [08]  other, specify
'ordinary' wvorker
C. 14.  Di mana saudara paling lama bertempat tinggal/dibesarkan  ( sebelum mahasiswa ) ?
Where were you brought up (longest residence, before becoming a student)
Desa  [00]  Ibukota propinsi kecuali Jakarta  [03]
village  provincial capital except  Jakarta
Ibukota kecamatan  [01]  Jakarta  [O4]
subdistrict town
Ibukota Kabupaten/Kotamadya  [02]  Luar Negeri  [05]
district capital  abroad
Lainnya, sebutkan  .[06]
other, specify
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APPENDIX B3:
Instructions  to respondents, medical student questionnaire
SURVEY  PREFERENSI  PENEMPATAN  DOKTER
PETUNJUK  PENGISIAN
A.  Bagian  Pertama ( halaman  depan )
*  Merupakan  identitas responden secara umum yang  terdiri dari wilayah penelitian  ( nama
kota ) dan universitas.
Lingkari jawaban  yang sesuai
Bila  nama universitas  tidak  tercantum  dalam  daftar,  lingkari  nomor  15 (  Universitas
lainnya ) dan tulis nama universitas tersebut.
B.  Bagian Kedua, merupakani pertanyaan utama tentang prefererisi dokter/calon dokter.
*  Setiap responden mendapat salah satu versi dari total 50 versi yang ada.
*  Bagian  ini terdiri  dari  18 pertanyaan  yang  merupakan  pilihan  kombinasi.  Untuk  setiap
pertanyaan  saudara diharapkan  memilih  salah satu dari  dua  pilihan jawaban  ( lingkari
nomor  I atau 2 ).
- Setiap  pertanyaan  merupakan  dua  kemungkinan  penempatan  tugas  dengan  berbagai
karakteristik,  yang akan dihadapi setelah saudara menyelesaikan pendidikan  kedokteran.
*  Bacalah dengan teliti sebelum menentukan pilihan/jawabain anda karena setiap kombinasi
pilihan adalah berbeda.
*  Saudara  harus  menentukan  pilihan  untuk  setiap  pertanyaan  walaupun  kombinasinya
dirasakan tidak realistik ( Jawaban harus satu pilihan dan tidak boleh kosong ).
*  Dalam pengisian  pertanyaan  dilarang untuk saling bertanya/berdiskusi  diantara  sesama
teman dan bila ada hal yang kurang jelas harap ditanyakan langsung kepada petugas.
- Setiap  pertanyaan  terdiri  dari  7 butir  kata yang  masing-masing  mempunyai  pengertian
sebagai berikut:
1.  Propinsi, adalah:
Lokasi yang menunjukkan tempat penempatan tugas tersebut diatas.
2.  Keterpencilan, adalahl:
Keadaan keterpencilan dari lokasi penempatan  tugas (  biasa,  terpencil  atau sangat
terpencil ).
3.  Tempat kerja,  adalah:
Jenis penempatan tugas ( tempat kerja ) berupa puskesmas atau klinik swasta dalam
rangka  menyelesaikan  wajib  kerja.  Dalam  hal  ini,  saudara  bekerja  secara
purnawaktu  dan tinggal di daerah tempat kerja tersebut kecuali dalam masa cuti.
4.  Lama ikatan kerja, adalahl:
Lamanya  suatu ikatan  kerja  atau masa kontrak dokter  di daerah tersebut  (dalam
satuan tahun).
5.  Pendapatan per  bulan adalah:
Total penghasilan rata-rata per bulan dari semua sumber, yaitu
a.  Gaji:  yang  dibayar  secara penuh  dan  tepat  waktu  selama saudara  memenuhi
kewajiban / tugas saudara.
b.  Praktek swasta.
6.  Kemungkinan diangkat pegawai negri, adalah:
Kesempatan  atau  peluang  untuk  diangkat  menjadi  Pegawai  Negri  Sipil  (  PNS  )
setelah  menyelesaikan  masa  ikatan  kerja,  yang  dinyatakan  dalam  bentuk
persentase.
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7.  Kesempatan spesialisasi, adalah
Kemungkinan mendapat peluang/kesempatan pendidikan  spesialis dengan beasiswa
setelah  menyelesaikan  masa  ikatan  kerja,  yang  dinyatakan  dalam  bentuk
persentase.
C.  Bagian Ketiga ( latar belakang)
*  Bagian ini merupakan data tentang demografi ( latar belakang responden  ) --  cukup jelas
*  Untuk setiap pertanyaan,  isilah jawaban  atau lingkari nomor yang sesuai.
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ANNEX  B4: Allowed  combinationis of remoteness  and province  ini  medical student  survey
Private clinic  nonremote  health  remote health  very remote health
center  center  center





East Nusa  ^
Tenggara
North Sumatra
Irian  Jaya  __r_r_i,,____________________
The shaded combinations  were  prohibited;  all unshaded  combinations  were  allowed.
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